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Path validation with RPKI draft

Posted 2019-06-20

Last week, I suggested it's time fix those BGP route leaks. I live by the words everybody complains about the weather, but nobody does anything about it, so as such I wrote an Internet-Draft with the protocol changes necessary:


I think we can stop these route leaks with a relatively modest change to RPKI: by combining the ASes the origin trusts and the ASes the operator of an RPKI relying party server trusts, we have a list of all the ASes that may legitimately appear in the AS path as seen from this particular vantage point.

I believe deployment will be relatively easy, as it works for the two ASes at both ends even if ASes in the middle don't participate.

There is path filter example code in the appendix to show that this part is easy. 😀

You can see that filter code in action here:


I'm looking forward to hearing feedback. I've started discussions on the RIPE routing-wg mailinglist and the IETF sidrops working group mailinglist. Also feel free to mail me directly or talk to me on Twitter.

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